For ten years, political alternatives have been debated within a single and monotonous idiom, of an ethical nature - "ours" (whoever they are) wished the best for the nation, unlike the others, who only wanted to grab power and take advantage of it in every conceivable way. Corruption was, consequently, the cited or underlying point, around which revolved all contradictions, all the minor political polemics, all struggles on Parliament's floor - and arguments, admittedly, have abounded. True, sometimes we saw timid accusations of incompetence, but only in a manner subordinated to the fundamental charges of bad intent, nepotism, corruption, theft and a few others. Now, when the abysmal gap between "ours" and "theirs" is beginning to narrow down, when almost any political alliance seems feasible, the criterion of competence will act as a value gauge, a more objective one, in any case, than the atavistic struggle between good ("ours") and evil ("theirs").
In fact, the emergence of technicians on the political stage is a signal that political life has already felt the electorate's sensitivity to the issue. This is an extremely optimistic supposition given the latest opinion polls, a supposition that has become even less attractive to political parties in view of these results, but it is the only one that can be used to build a connection between the country's reality (including the economic one) and the political bickering-about. Even accepting this working hypothesis, something is still missing - namely, a certain hierarchy of values amongst professionals, which so far has lacked because of the dearth of professionals, but also because of the stark predominance of the political criterion (the algorithm).
Politicians and specialists
In the terms of modern democracy, the line between politicians and technocrats is defined by the need to adopt ethical (moral) decisions, as opposed to professional ones (economic, legislative). Thus, central banks (Federal reserves, the European Central Bank) and not only those, are authorised by the US Congress or the European Parliament to conduct the monetary policy. Similarly, the legislative can delegate various attributions to professional institutions, or it can demand an analysis of the situation, while the forum elected by direct vote makes a decision on which course of policy to follow. But with transition in full swing, when the entire institutional and policy structuring framework needs to be built, technocrats' role is much more important than in a mature democracy. While staying within the boundaries of the ethical criterion (an attribute of politics), the professional criterion gains a particular importance; more precisely, this is equivalent to the need to hire competent professionals for jobs that are political by excellence. However, since 50 years of communism have produced different political sensibilities (and the ethical criterion is so much more crucial), the struggle for the supremacy of the professional (technocrat) or the political (algorithm) appears natural, but every bit as damaging to the overall development.
The obstacles faced by those who are attempting to institute the principle of competence, erected by those who never gave up their purely political militant habits, have stood in the way of building objective value criteria. Even when the criterion of professionalism was brought into attention, it had a rather political flavour - neither yours nor ours, a "technocrat." The technocrat has thus become not a professional, but a bizarre character, outside major political parties, who comes, does his job, and leaves. This character did not appear out of the necessity for an impeccable professional performance, but again, because of political struggle.
Consequently, there can be no question about a set of values among technocrats, as long as to join their ranks, one has to meet the minimum requirement of not being a member in any party (at the moment). The image of the high-class technocrat was built, who keeps the leu in balance in the face of reckless politicians, or who builds medium- and long-term programmes to deal with Romania's problems. Even the recent elections for the Bucharest city hall can be interpreted as a victory of a professional by image (albeit a party vice-president) against candidates backed by parties.
The technocrat's myth
The myth of the almighty technocrat is nothing new in this region of Europe, which only recently broke up with communism. But it may be rooted in restructuring plans of pure communism, which, in the '80s, promoted to nomenclature positions people with a brief history in the party's ranks. In Hungary and Poland, for instance, freedom enjoyed by company management helped such people into leadership positions. Later, even some of the top positions were offered to new people with a technocratic image, as a concession the communist regime made, pressured by poor economic performance on one hand, and political criticism, on the other. Eventually, reform in the first years of transition was led in the most advanced countries by these personalities, accepted by the international financial environment as professionals. In Poland, Balczerowicz (whose name remains connected to the 1990 stabilisation programme) was already an acknowledged economist who had worked for the London School of Economics since the early '80s. In the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, in spite of all the criticism (especially policy-related), was also a recognised personality. The Czech Central Bank, led by Josef Tosovsky, is recognised as an important research centre (perhaps despite its monetary policy, bent on intervention), and so is the Central Bank of Hungary, whose governor, Gyorgy Suranyi, is assimilated to monetary stability in this country. Numerous personalities (technocrats), including Janos Kornai, a Hungarian economist settled in the United States, who had a remarkable contribution to the study of transition economies, have had a crucial role in attracting professional competencies from the IMF and World Bank, which found in them equal discussion partners.
Professionals before elections
Two comments result from this hypothesis of the technocrat's origins. The first is his acceptance as a necessary evil, as a concession the political world makes to criteria it cannot understand. The second is the distinction between the role of the technocrat in the first stage of transition (accepted by the communists) and his role as a solution to the interminable political struggles. Another comment, with a direct applicability in Romania, is that technocrats usually don't come out of the blue; they pertain to a certain continuity of the school of economics they attended in their country of origin or abroad. But the relative slowness and numerous hiccups in Romania's relationship with international financial institutions are also explained by the lack of professionals capable of talking the same language as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Interpreted from this angle, that of the technocrat against the politician, all negotiations underway today don't hold the promise of anything good. Despite rumours about secret preparation of various government programmes, it is very likely that the "electoral offer" (a term that erroneously suggests the idea of a market) will perfectly resemble the situation four years ago - millions of jobs, agriculture, tourism, corruption, the need for change/stability. Even this time, the technocrat will not become what he should be, a professional. Because a professional never won an election. In every case, professionals have been backed by political forces, and not vice versa. And what can be seen these days in Romania is the attempt of the political world to take advantage of the image transplant from technocrats, who so far have received no help from it, and whose competence they have ignored so far, paying constant attention to the algorithm.
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